Disease X and other unknowns by Honigsbaum, M.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Honigsbaum, M. ORCID: 0000-0002-1891-8763 (2019). Disease X and other 
unknowns. The Lancet, 393(10180), pp. 1496-1497. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30803-7 
This is the published version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24227/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(19)30803-7
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
  
Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with 
free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-
19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the 
company's public news and information website. 
 
Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related 
research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this 
research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other 
publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights 
for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means 
with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are 
granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre 
remains active. 
 
Perspectives
1496 www.thelancet.com   Vol 393   April 13, 2019
The art of medicine 
Disease X and other unknowns
On Feb 26, 2003, Carlo Urbani, an infectious diseases 
specialist in WHO’s country office in Vietnam, was called 
to the French Hospital in Hanoi to examine a grievously ill 
Chinese-American businessman. Johnny Chen had been 
admitted with severe breathing difficulties shortly after 
stepping off a flight from Hong Kong and was being nursed 
in intensive care, where x-rays revealed ominous shadows on 
his lungs. Fearing Chen had a virulent form of avian influenza, 
Urbani convinced the Vietnamese authorities to quarantine 
the hospital and made staff wear high-filter masks and 
double gowns. But the tests for avian influenza were 
negative and by the end of the week, 14 doctors and nurses 
were ill with the same respiratory symptoms as Chen. Urbani 
did not realise it, but he was dealing with a virus that was 
entirely new to medical science. Within days, the disease had 
spread to five other countries and WHO had given it a name: 
severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). A few weeks later, 
WHO would identify SARS as a new type of coronavirus, but 
by then both Chen and Urbani were dead and many other 
health workers across the globe had also been infected.
In 2018, recognising that a “serious international 
epidemic could be caused by a pathogen currently unknown 
to cause human disease”, WHO added a new category to 
its emergency priority list: Disease X. In the taxonomy of 
knowledge, Disease X corresponds to what the former US 
Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld infamously termed an 
“unknown unknown”. A classic example is HIV, the virus 
now known to be the cause of AIDS but which, in 1980, 
when doctors began treating the first patients with AIDS, 
had never been seen to cause disease in humans.
However, AIDS was not the first time a previously 
unknown pathogen had caught scientists unaware. In 1976, 
the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
had been baffled by an outbreak of atypical pneumonia at 
an American Legion convention in Philadelphia, PA, USA. At 
first, the CDC was convinced the outbreak at the Bellevue-
Stratford Hotel was caused by a new swine influenza 
virus and convinced the Ford administration to vaccinate 
millions of Americans. Then, when swine influenza was 
ruled out, they wondered whether the Legionnaires had 
been poisoned with phosgene gas or a toxic metal. In fact, 
the culprit was a tiny bacterium, Legionella pneumophila, 
that thrives in aquatic environments, including the cooling 
towers of hotels. In the case of the Bellevue-Stratford, the 
organism had most likely been aerosolised by the hotel’s 
antiquated air conditioning system. Later, it was realised the 
bacterium had been the cause of earlier outbreaks at other 
institutions, but because scientists lacked an appropriate 
stain for the organism, the outbreaks had never been solved.
Given the history of microbiology and that the past 
century has been littered with similar missed alarms, the only 
wonder is that WHO did not think to coin the term Disease 
X sooner. From the 1918 “Spanish” influenza pandemic—
initially blamed on a bacterium rather than a virus—to the 
1930 “parrot fever” pandemic, which was initially thought to 
be typhoid until it was discovered that parrots and parakeets 
harboured a tiny bacterium, Chlamydia psittaci, which when 
inhaled could cause a deadly pneumonia, to the epidemics 
of Ebola virus disease and Zika virus infection in the 
21st century, medical confidence has been repeatedly rocked 
by unexpected outbreaks of infectious disease.
This is not simply because, as is sometimes argued, 
microbes are constantly mutating and evolving, out-
stripping our ability to keep pace with their shifting genetics 
and transmission patterns. It is also because of the tendency 
of medical researchers to become prisoners of particular 
scientific models and theories of disease causation, blinding 
them to the threats posed by pathogens both known and 
unknown. Thus, in the case of SARS, scientists’ delay in 
realising they were dealing with a new respiratory pathogen 
was due in no small part to their conviction that the world 
was on the brink of an epidemic of H5N1 avian influenza—a 
view that seemed to be confirmed when ducks, geese, and 
swans suddenly began dying in two Hong Kong parks. In 
other words, the known threat of H5N1 blinded researchers 
to the unknown threat of SARS.
But on other occasions, it is incomplete knowledge that 
can confound health experts and breed false confidence. Take 
Zika virus infection, the mosquito-borne illness responsible 
for a major epidemic in Brazil and other Latin American 
countries in 2015–16. Scientists had known about Zika since 
1947, when the virus was first isolated in Uganda. However, Gor
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because Zika was thought to cause a self-limiting human 
illness, it was largely overlooked by medical researchers until 
2015, when Brazilian women who had been infected with 
the virus during pregnancy began giving birth to children 
with microcephaly and other neurological disorders.
Similarly, in the spring of 2014, most infectious disease 
experts could not envision that Ebola, a virus previously 
confined to remote forested regions of Central Africa, might 
spark an epidemic in a major city in Sierra Leone or Liberia, 
much less across the Atlantic to threaten citizens of Europe 
and the USA. But that is precisely what happened when 
Ebola emerged from an unknown animal reservoir to infect 
a 2-year-old boy in southeastern Guinea, from where the 
virus travelled by road to Conakry, Freetown, and Monrovia, 
and by air to Brussels, London, Madrid, New York, and Dallas. 
In each case, what was known before the outbreak—that 
Ebola is unlikely to reach a major urban area or that Zika is a 
disease that causes a mild rash-like illness and is not a threat 
to unborn babies—was shown to be wrong.
Another lesson of these recent epidemics is that by 
focusing on specific microbial pathogens—whether Ebola, 
SARS, or Disease X—we risk missing the bigger ecological 
picture. Thus, it is only when tropical rain forests are 
degraded by clear-cutting, dislodging from their roosts the 
bats in which the Ebola virus is presumed to reside between 
epidemics, or when people hunt chimpanzees infected with 
the virus and butcher them for the table, that Ebola risks 
spilling over into humans. And it is only when the blood-
borne infection is amplified by fragile health systems and 
poor hospital hygiene practices that it is likely to spread to 
the wider community and have a chance of reaching urban 
areas. Similarly, the 2014–15 Zika epidemic might have been 
averted, or its impact reduced, if municipal authorities in 
Recife and other Brazilian cities had provided regular water 
services to women living in favelas where the Aedes mosquito 
that transmits the virus breeds in uncovered water containers 
and other sources of standing water. Such measures would 
also help reduce the risk of epidemics caused by other viruses 
transmitted by Aedes, such as dengue and yellow fever.
In such circumstances, it is worth keeping in mind 
the view expressed by George Bernard Shaw in his play 
The Doctor’s Dilemma, namely, that “the characteristic 
microbe of a disease might be a symptom instead of a 
cause”. Indeed, updating Shaw’s axiom for the 21st century, 
we might say that infectious diseases nearly always have 
wider environmental and social causes, and unless and 
until we take account of the ecological, immunological, and 
behavioural factors that govern the emergence and spread of 
novel pathogens, our knowledge of such microbes and their 
connection to disease will always be partial.
In fairness, there have always been medical researchers 
prepared to take a more nuanced view of our complex 
interactions with microbes. For instance, writing at the 
height of the so-called conquest of infectious disease, the 
Rockefeller researcher René Dubos (1901–82) cautioned 
against the prevailing medical hubris. “Modern man 
believes that he has achieved almost complete mastery 
over the natural forces which molded his evolution in the 
past and that he can now control his own biological and 
cultural destiny”, Dubos warned in his 1959 book Mirage 
of Health. “But this may be an illusion. Like all other living 
things, he is part of an immensely complex ecological 
system and is bound to all its components by innumerable 
links.” Instead, Dubos argued that complete freedom from 
disease was a “mirage” and that “at some unpredictable 
time and in some unforeseeable manner nature will strike 
back”. Yet for all that Dubos’s writings were hugely popular 
with the American public in the 1960s, his warnings of a 
coming disease Armageddon were largely ignored by his 
scientific colleagues. The result was that when, shortly 
after his death in 1982, the CDC coined the acronym AIDS 
to describe an unusual autoimmune condition that had 
suddenly appeared in the gay community in Los Angeles 
and New York and was now spreading to other segments 
of the population, it took the medical world by surprise and 
sparked hysterical media coverage. 
Thankfully, the lessons of AIDS were not lost on Dubos’s 
colleague Joshua Lederberg (1925–2008), the head of 
Rockefeller University, who in an influential 1992 report for 
the US Institute of Medicine called for medical researchers 
to pay attention to other emerging infectious diseases. 
Lederberg argued that air travel and the mass movements 
of goods and people from one part of the globe to another 
had tilted the balance in favour of microbes, altering what 
Stephen Morse, another Rockefeller researcher, called “the 
rules of viral traffic”. The insight was taken up by the writer 
Laurie Garrett, who as a science reporter had witnessed the 
ravages of AIDS first-hand. Thanks to globalisation, “few 
habitats on the globe remain truly isolated or untouched”, 
she argued in her 1994 book, The Coming Plague. AIDS “does 
not stand alone”, she concluded but was a harbinger of 
epidemics and pandemics to come. Two decades later, the 
world has yet to witness a pandemic comparable to AIDS. 
However, with WHO and governments currently battling 
outbreaks of Lassa fever in Nigeria, measles in Madagascar, 
hantavirus pulmonary syndrome in Argentina, Ebola virus 
disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and rising 
numbers of vaccine-preventable diseases in Europe this 
is no time for complacency. Instead, medical researchers 
would do well to cultivate what Dubos termed “an alertness 
to the unexpected” and keep in mind that too much 
knowledge can be as much of a trap as too little.
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